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Perception is the foundation of cognition and is fundamental to our beliefs and consequent
action planning.The Editorial (this issue) asks: “what mechanisms, if any, mediate between
perceptual and cognitive processes?” It has recently been argued that attention might fur-
nish such a mechanism. In this paper, we pursue the idea that action planning (motor
preparation) is an attentional phenomenon directed toward kinesthetic signals. This rests
on a view of motor control as active inference, where predictions of proprioceptive signals
are fulﬁlled by peripheral motor reﬂexes. If valid, active inference suggests that attention
should not be limited to the optimal biasing of perceptual signals in the exteroceptive (e.g.,
visual) domain but should also bias proprioceptive signals during movement. Here, we
investigate this idea using a classical attention (Posner) paradigm cast in a motor setting.
Specially, we looked for decreases in reaction times when movements were preceded
by valid relative to invalid cues. Furthermore, we addressed the hierarchical level at which
putative attentional effects were expressed by independently cueing the nature of the
movement and the hand used to execute it. We found a signiﬁcant interaction between
the validity of movement and effector cues on reaction times. This suggests that atten-
tional bias might be mediated at a low level in the motor hierarchy, in an intrinsic frame
of reference. This ﬁnding is consistent with attentional enabling of top-down predictions
of proprioceptive input and may rely upon the same synaptic mechanisms that mediate
directed spatial attention in the visual system.
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INTRODUCTION
During the preparation and execution of goal-directed move-
ments, processing is biased toward the perceptual attributes of
the goal (e.g., Baldauf and Deubel, 2010; Gherri and Eimer, 2010;
Humphreys et al., 2010; Perfetti et al., 2010) and preparation or
execution of an action improves perceptual processing in rele-
vant sensory domains (Fagioli et al., 2007). This suggests motor
planning and attention are inherently linked, such that“perceptual
codes and action plans share a common representational medium,
which presumably involves the human premotor cortex” (Fagioli
et al., 2007). This relates to the concept of motor attention that
is speciﬁc to the effectors employed (Rushworth et al., 2001) and
decision making through attentional selection among motor plans
(Goldberg and Segraves, 1987). Moreover, the premotor theory of
visual attention (Rizzolatti et al., 1994) proposes that distinct maps
are tuned to different effector representations and become active
when amovement is prepared. In short, attention has a fundamen-
tal role in the selection and control of action; see Allport (1987)
for a review.
The link between action and attention and was ﬁrst proposed
by James (1890) and Woodworth (1899): however, the cognitive
and neural mechanisms responsible for this association remain
largely unknown (Dalrymple and Kingstone, 2010). Greenwald
(1970) provided evidence that attention to a particular sensory
modality speeded movements that are detected in that modality:
In the oculomotor system, visual discrimination performance is
enhanced at the target location of a prepared saccade (Deubel
and Schneider, 1996). Furthermore, stimulation of the superior
colliculus can produce both eye movements (Robinson, 1972) and
shifts of attention (Müller et al., 2005). Conversely,Craighero et al.
(1999) showed that reaction times to visually presented objects
are reduced when subjects grasp the objects being presented,
illustrating the motor facilitation of sensory processing.
In this paper, we entertain the idea that motor attention uses
exactly the same synapticmechanisms as visual attention.Thismay
sound strange because motor commands are usually considered to
be outputs, whereas the visual channels selected by attention are
inputs. However, recent theoretical treatments of motor control
(active inference) regard action as being driven by proprioceptive
prediction errors in exactly the same way that perception is driven
by exteroceptive prediction errors (Friston et al., 2010). If true, this
means that attentional modulation may operate at low levels in the
motor system in the sameway that it operates in the early visual sys-
tem. We sought evidence for this by reproducing a classical visual
attention paradigm (Posner et al., 1978; Posner, 1980) in themotor
domain. Furthermore, by cueing attention to different attributes
of movements we tried to locate the putative attentional modula-
tionwithin themotor hierarchy.Wehoped to show that attentional
effects were expressed in low levels (in an intrinsic frame of refer-
ence) inmuch the sameway that directed spatial attention operates
in the early visual pathways. This paper comprises four sections.
The ﬁrst rehearses the theoretical background that motivated a
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reaction time study described in the second section. The third
section presents our results, which are discussed in relation to
theoretical considerations in the ﬁnal section.
ACTIVE INFERENCE AND MOTOR ATTENTION
In this section, we consider motor preparation as attention that is
directed toward predicted proprioceptive sensations (Galazky et al.,
2009), as opposed to the predicted exteroceptive consequences of
action. This idea is motivated by the success of a recent computa-
tional model of attention in explaining reaction times beneﬁts in
visual detection tasks (Feldman and Friston, 2010). In this model,
the effects of orienting cues on reaction times were explained by
the Bayes-optimal encoding of precision in a hierarchicalmessage-
passing scheme (predictive coding). In this context, precision is the
inverse variance or uncertainty associated with particular sensory
channels, such that attention can be understood as weighting sen-
sory signals in proportion to their precision (Feldman and Friston,
2010; Friston, 2010). In these predictive coding schemes, precision
is encoded by the gain of units reporting bottom-up sensory infor-
mation that has yet to be explained by top-down predictions. This
sensory information is called prediction error and is generally asso-
ciated with the activity of superﬁcial pyramidal cells: these cells
are the source of forward or bottom-up projections in the brain
(Rockland and Pandya, 1979; Mumford, 1992; Friston, 2010). In
these schemes, attention therefore reduces to the optimization of
the postsynaptic gain of superﬁcial pyramidal cells, of the sort
associated with gamma-synchronization (e.g., Womelsdorf et al.,
2006) and monoaminergic or cholinergic modulation (e.g., Her-
rero et al., 2008); both of which have been implicated in attention.
Here, we pursue the notion that attention is the optimum weight-
ing of prediction error in the context of action preparation (Mars
et al., 2007; Bestmann et al., 2008). In short, we consider atten-
tion to boost the gain of proprioceptive channels during motor
preparation, in the sameway that attention selects particular visual
channels when subjects prepare for a visual target. In what follows,
we will brieﬂy review predictive coding and active inference, with
a special focus on the role of attention.
PREDICTIVE CODING AND ACTIVE INFERENCE
Predictive coding is based on the assumption that the brain makes
inferences about the causes of its sensations. These inferences
are driven by bottom-up or forward sensory information that
is passed to higher brain areas in the form of prediction errors
(Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston and Kiebel, 2009). Top-down or
backward connections convey predictions that try to suppress pre-
diction errors until predictions are optimized and prediction error
is minimized. This suppression rests on opposing excitatory and
inhibitory effects of top-down predictions and bottom-up inputs
on prediction-error units (usually considered to be superﬁcial
pyramidal cells: Mumford, 1992). Active inference (Friston et al.,
2010) generalizes this scheme and proposes that exactly the same
recursive message-passing operates in the motor system. The only
difference is that prediction errors at the lowest level (in the cranial
nerve nuclei and spinal cord) are also suppressed by movement,
through classical reﬂex arcs. In this view, descending (cortico-
spinal) signals are not motor commands per se but predictions
of proprioceptive signals that the peripheral motor system fulﬁlls
(see Friston et al., 2010, 2011 for details). As illustrated in Figure 1,
a cued movement is not regarded as a simple stimulus–response
mapping but is generated by a high-level (sensorimotor) percept
that predicts a particular pattern of proprioceptive and extero-
ceptive sensory signals. This percept arises to explain prediction
errors caused by a cue in the exteroceptive domain, while motor
reﬂexes suppress the ensuing prediction errors in the propriocep-
tive domain. This framework has been used to explain several
features of the motor system and a series of behaviors, from visual
tracking (Friston et al., 2010) to action observation (Friston et al.,
2011). Active inference formalizes much of what is proposed by
the ideomotor theory of action (Lotze, 1852; James, 1890). The
ideomotor account of motor control posits that moving causes a
bidirectional association to be formed between a movement and
its perceptual consequences. Learning this association allows the
perceptual consequences of amovement tobepredicted,and antic-
ipating the sensory consequences of a movement can be used to
select an action. At the level of the stretch receptors, the sim-
ilarity is clear: signaling the predicted sensory consequences of
an action (under active inference) causes the action to occur. At
higher hierarchical levels,movements can still be initiated in order
to change the sensory input in another sensory system; indeed the
free-energy principle demands the sampling of predicted informa-
tion tominimize free energy or,more simply, surprise. See Figure 1
for a schematic illustration.
ATTENTION AND ACTIVE INFERENCE
Attention enters this picture through context or state-dependent
optimization of the precision of prediction errors. This sort of pre-
diction is about the second-order statistics of sensory signals (i.e.,
their variability or reliability). In predictive coding, top-downﬁrst-
order predictions drive (or inhibit) neurons reporting prediction
errors; while contextual, second-order predictions optimize their
postsynaptic gain. It is this sort of top-down effect that is asso-
ciated with attention. Neurobiologically, the distinction between
ﬁrst and second-order predictions can be related to the distinction
between the driving and modulatory effects mediated by AMPA
and NMDA receptors. Optimizing postsynaptic gain ensures that
sensory information (prediction error) is weighted in proportion
to its precision. This may sound complicated but is exactly the
same procedure we use every day in statistics, when weighting a
difference in means (prediction error under the null hypothesis)
by SE (inverse precision) to form a t -statistic. Precision can thus
be regarded as representing the reliability, ambiguity, or uncer-
tainty about sensory signals. In summary, top-down predictions
can have a direct (ﬁrst-order) or a modulatory (second-order)
effect on the responses of prediction-error units that make the
ensuing predictions as efﬁcient as possible. Reaction time (Good-
man and Kelso, 1980), cortico-spinal excitability (Mars et al., 2007;
Bestmann et al., 2008), and EEG data (Osman et al., 1995; Mars
et al., 2008) all conﬁrm that the motor system is highly sensitive
to such second-order effects.
If ascending sensory signals are prediction errors and descend-
ing motor commands are predictions, then optimal predictions
(and the resulting movements) should depend on optimizing pre-
cision in exactly the same way as in sensory processing. This
suggests that, in the motor domain, cueing has a similar effect
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FIGURE 1 | Active inference and predictive coding: Active inference is a
generalization of predictive coding that covers motor behaviors and
itself is a special instance of the principle of free-energy minimization.
Free energy is a statistical quantity that bounds the surprise (self-information)
associated with sensory signals. This surprise is quantiﬁed in relation to a
generative model of how those signals were caused. Predictive coding uses
prediction error as a proxy for free energy (cf, surprise) and rests on a
hierarchical model, in which prediction errors are passed up the hierarchy (red
arrows) to optimize high-level representations that provide top-down
predictions (black arrows). In this schematic, prediction-error units are
portrayed in red and units encoding the conditional expectations of the hidden
causes of sensory input are shown in blue. During perception, the best
explanation for sensory input emerges when the top-down predictions can
explain as much of the prediction error (at each hierarchical level) as possible.
Active inference takes this one step further and notes that certain sensory
modalities can use prediction errors to drive motoneurons to eliminate
prediction error directly (through classical motor reﬂex arcs). This is shown
schematically on the lower left, using units in the dorsal and ventral horns of
the spinal cord. Under active inference, a movement just fulﬁlls the
predictions afforded by percepts that predict both exteroceptive (e.g., visual)
and interoceptive (e.g., stretch receptor) consequences. This high-level
(sensorimotor) percept is activated by an exteroceptive (sensory) cue and the
ensuing top-down predictions propagate to both sensory cortex (to suppress
exteroceptive prediction error) and the motor system. However, in the motor
system, the predictions engender a proprioceptive prediction error that is
eliminated by movement. In this schematic, we have assumed that prediction
errors are reported by superﬁcial pyramidal cells (Mumford, 1992), while
conditional representations are encoded by (top-down) projecting deep
pyramidal cells. Darker units highlight those activated by the presentation of a
target-stimulus.
to that observed in the sensory domain: Rosenbaum (1980) ﬁrst
demonstrated an effect of movement cueing on reaction time in a
way that is analogous to the accelerated detection of visual targets
when they are preceded by valid cues in the Posner paradigm (Pos-
ner, 1980). However the movements cued in Rosenbaum (1980)
were button presses, which required either visual or somatosen-
sory attention to guide movement to the target. Thus, these
non-proprioceptive aspects of button presses conﬂate attentional
effects in visual, somatosensory, and proprioceptive domains. In
other words, in previous work movements were planned in rela-
tion to an object in extra-personal space. Here, we used a sim-
pler paradigm in which movements (wrist ﬂexion and extension)
could be performed using only proprioceptive information. This
ensured that any attentional effects could be attributed to propri-
oception. Our motor analog of the Posner paradigm therefore
allowed us to interpret our results in relation to visual atten-
tion as modeled in Feldman and Friston (2010); and to illustrate
how active inference provides a framework in which to address
questions about the functional anatomy of action preparation and
attention.
CUEING IN AN EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC FRAME OF REFERENCE?
A key question in the functional anatomy of motor attention
is where biasing effects are located in the cortical hierarchy:
see Grafton and Hamilton (2007) for a review of motor hier-
archies. In the sensory domain, attention is usually considered
to operate at the lower levels of sensory hierarchies to select
among competing sensory processing channels. This is seen in
both psychological (e.g., the distinction between object and spa-
tial visual attention: Treisman, 1998; Macaluso et al., 2003) and
electrophysiological treatments (e.g., biased competition models:
Desimone and Duncan, 1995). If the functional anatomy of the
motor hierarchy recapitulates that of sensory hierarchies, then
one might expect to see attentional modulation in lower levels,
which we will associate with representations in an intrinsic frame
of reference.
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Electrophysiological evidence demonstrates that between the
ventral premotor cortex and M1 neurons change their response
patterns from signaling movements in a visual (extrinsic) coordi-
nate system that is independent of starting posture to a motor
(intrinsic) coordinate system that depends on starting posture
(Kakei et al., 1999, 2001, 2003). Thus in ventral premotor cor-
tex, actions are largely encoded allocentrically, while in M1 they
are predominantly encoded in terms of the joint angles and pro-
prioceptive input required to reach the target (Soechting and
Flanders, 1992). Shipp (2005) suggests that neurons represent-
ing movements in an intrinsic frame of reference send descending
cortico-spinal predictions from M1. Kakei et al. (2003) provide a
detailed discussion of movement representations in terms of the
coordinate transformations that begin with an “extrinsic coordi-
nate frame representing the spatial location of a target and end
with an intrinsic coordinate frame describing muscle activation
patterns.” It should be noted however, that the segregation of
intrinsic and extrinsic representations between motor and premo-
tor cortex may not be complete or unique (Wu and Hatsopoulos,
2007).
These observations suggest two possible levels of the motor
hierarchy at which attentional cueing effects could operate. Con-
sider movements with two dimensions or attributes that are cued
in an extrinsic frame of reference; for example, moving the left or
right hand (where) inward or outward (what ). If attention oper-
ates at high levels of the motor hierarchy, then one might expect
cues to move the hand inward will facilitate inward movements,
irrespective of which hand is used. This is because the representa-
tion of themovement can be primed in extrinsic coordinates, prior
to transformation to intrinsic coordinates. Conversely, if atten-
tion operates at lower levels, encoding the muscle groups involved
in inward movements of the left hand, then attentional priming
will only be expressed when the left hand is moved inward. In
short, if attention operates on prediction errors in an intrinsic
frame of reference, the effect of the what cue will depend upon the
where cue.
In summary, if sensorimotor constructs mediate attentional
biases in an extrinsic frame of reference, we would expect to
see cueing effects on both dimensions independently. Conversely,
if these representations instantiate top-down biases at a lower
(intrinsic) level of the motor system, then only a particular
movement (in an intrinsic frame of reference) will be cued.
Figure 2 tries to make the different predictions clear in terms
of top-down enabling of postsynaptic gain (indicated with blue
arrows). Crucially, the proﬁle of speeded responses (under valid
and invalid cueing) is different for extrinsic and intrinsic lev-
els of attentional gain. In the intrinsic (motor cortex) model,
there should be an interaction between the validity effects of cues
over both movement dimensions. Conversely, under the extrin-
sic (premotor cortex) model, there should be no interaction but
two main effects due to the validity of both what and where
aspects of the cue. It was this difference in the proﬁle of valid-
ity effects on reaction times our experiment was designed to
reveal.
Based on the results of Jentzsch et al. (2004) and the retinotopic
frame of reference of attentional effects in the Posner paradigm
(Woldorff et al., 1997), we hypothesize that attentional cueing
operates in an intrinsic frame of reference. We therefore expected
to see an interaction between the validity effects of cueing, with
speeded responses when, and only when, both what and where
dimensions were valid.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Eight healthy right-handed volunteers (two female), aged 19–
42, participated in this experiment. All subjects provided written
and informed consent and the experiments were conducted in
compliance with the standards established by the local ethical
committee.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE AND EMG RECORDINGS
Subjects were seated in a comfortable reclining chair. Their wrists
were in a semi-supine position with the palms facing each other
and supported by a splint that restrictedwrist and handmovement
to pure ﬂexion and extension. The hand-splints were mounted on
vertical spindles, which allowed rotation in the transverse plane.
The hands were positioned such that the wrist joints sat directly
above the axes of rotation. Additional support of the forearms fur-
ther ensured that movements were constrained to the wrists, and
reduced fatigue. Stimuliwere viewedon a screen placed at eye level.
Each trial started with a (150 ms) cue stimulus, followed by a blank
screen (see Figure 3). Seven hundred millisecond after the appear-
ance of the cue, a target-stimulus appeared for 400 ms. A 50-ms
white-noise mask was presented after the cue and target stim-
uli to prevent the appearance of visual after-effects. Participants
were given 1000 ms after the appearance of the target-stimulus to
make a response. No feedback was given. At the appearance of the
target-stimulus, participants were required to respond as quickly
as possible with the movement indicated. Four movements were
possible – ﬂexion or extension at the left or right wrist. The cue
and target stimuli had two dimensions – color (blue, red) and
spatial frequency (high, low). For four of the participants, the
color of the stimulus cued the hand (e.g., blue= left, red= right)
and the spatial frequency indicated the movement (e.g., high fre-
quency= ﬂexion, low frequency= extension). For the remaining
four, the stimulus–response mapping was reversed, so that color
indicated themovement to bemade and spatial frequency the hand
to be used. The stimuli subtended approximately 35˚ of visual
angle. High-frequency stimuli were 2.5 c/deg, low frequency were
0.25 c/deg. The colors had RGB values ([128 0 0] [255 100 100])
and ([0 0 128] [100 100 255]).
Participants were required to relax their hands and lower arms
until the appearance of the target-stimulus. Our paradigm inde-
pendently cued which motor and (right or left) would implement
one of two movements (wrist ﬂexion or extension). Each cue con-
tained two dimensions – one signaling the hand to be moved
and one the movement. For each dimension (color, spatial fre-
quency), cue stimuli could be valid (80%) or invalid with regards
to the target-stimulus (20%). Since the validity of the cue in each
dimension was independent, this gave 64% (0.8× 0.8) of trials
with a completely valid cue, 32% (0.8 × 0.2× 2) of trials where
either the hand or the movement required was invalidly cued and
4% (0.2× 0.2) of trials where both the hand and movement were
cued invalidly. The experiment comprised one training session
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FIGURE 2 | Different levels of attentional bias:This schematic illustrates
the top-down enabling of postsynaptic gain (blue arrows) at different
levels in the motor hierarchy. In the left panel, the predictions of an inward
(ﬂexion) movement of the left-hand selectively bias the intrinsic
prediction-error units that elicit inward movements of the left hand. This
means that when a valid target-stimulus appears, these prediction errors will
produce a more efﬁcient and speeded movement (be eliciting stronger
descending predictions). Conversely, if the attentional bias is mediated at the
premotor (extrinsic) level, the prediction errors associated with both what and
where aspects of the movement will facilitate speed responses over both
movement dimensions; e.g., all left-hand movements and all inward
movements. In this ﬁgure, darker units highlight prediction-error units with
increased gain. The lower graphs show the predicted proﬁle of reaction times
(under valid and invalid cueing) for cueing at extrinsic (right) and intrinsic (left)
levels. In the intrinsic (motor cortex) model, there should be an interaction
between the validity effects of cues over both movement dimensions. In
other words, the beneﬁt using the expected hand will only be seen if the
expected movement is required. Conversely, under the extrinsic (ventral
premotor cortex) model, there should be no interaction but two main effects
due to the validity of what and where aspects of the movement respectively.
and 25 experimental sessions. Each session contained 100 trials,
which were balanced for the four types of cue and four move-
ments. The large number of trials was needed to acquire sufﬁcient
data from trials with invalid cues in both dimensions. The sessions
were conducted over three separate days.
Reaction times were evaluated using surface EMG. Ag/AgCl
electrodes were placed on the left and right brachioradi-
alis/extensor carpi radialis longus and ﬂexor carpi ulnaris mus-
cles. Muscle activity was monitored throughout the experiment
to ensure the effector muscles were relaxed before the appear-
ance of the target-stimulus. Signals were recorded via a CED
1401 laboratory interface (Cambridge Electronic Design Ltd.,
Cambridge, UK) and stored on a personal computer (for later
analysis) at a sample rate of 5 kHz (Signal 2.0, Cambridge Elec-
tronic Design Ltd.). Data were bandpass-ﬁltered between 3 Hz
and 2.5 kHz.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
EMG data were smoothed with a Butterworth low-pass ﬁlter with
a cutoff frequency of 600 Hz to increase signal-to-noise. After
full-wave rectiﬁcation the data were log-transformed to provide
normally distributed time series for further analysis. The mean
of 100 consecutive data points was compared with the mean of
the preceding 5000 data points, using two-sample t -tests and a
sliding window. Reaction times were deﬁned operationally as the
ﬁrst time at which the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeded 50.
This ad hoc threshold identiﬁed the highest number of correctly
performed trials. Incorrect trials, where a muscle other than the
agonist for the correct movement showed the shortest reaction
time, were excluded.
A standard summary statistic method was used for statistical
inference, using the log of the mean reaction times (to correct
for positive skew) over each of the four conditions, for each sub-
ject. Univariate ﬁve-way ANOVA was performed in SPSS, with
factors HAND CUE VALIDITY (valid vs. invalid), MOVEMENT
CUE VALIDITY (valid vs. invalid), HAND (left vs. right), MOVE-
MENT(ﬂexion vs. extension). Factors SUBJECTand STIMULUS–
RESPONSE MAPPING were nested and were implemented in two
separate ANOVA models.
RESULTS
Thirteen percentage of trials (range over subjects 8–22%) were
discarded. Of these trials, in 2% no movement was made or no
movement could be identiﬁed. In the remaining 11%, an incor-
rect movement was made (error trials). Error trial frequency
varied signiﬁcantly by cue type (p< 0.001, χ2> 400, 1 d.f.),
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FIGURE 3 | Experimental Design:Top panel: Schematic showing the
time-line of three experimental trials, which comprised cue stimuli
that could be congruent (valid) or incongruent (invalid) over each of
their two dimensions (what:extension vs. flexion; where:left vs.
right hand). Bottom panel: Example EMG trace acquired from a single
muscle, plotted with the transform used for identifying movement onset.
The line shows the ad hoc threshold used to derive reaction times
automatically.
with errors less likely on validly cued trials. The most common
error (64% of errors) was making the incorrect movement with
the correct hand. The least common error (10% of errors) was
making the correct movement with the wrong hand. Among
invalidly cued trials, performing the movement speciﬁed by the
cue stimulus rather than the target-stimulus occurred signiﬁ-
cantly more often (p< 0.05, χ2> 6.01, 1 d.f.). Since the EMG
measured the onset of movement rather than the endpoint, chang-
ing the response before the movement was completed resulted
in an error trial. This may explain the comparatively high error
rate seen here, compared with more traditional button-press
paradigms.
The grand average reaction time was 334 ms. There was no
signiﬁcant main effect of HAND, MOVEMENT, or STIMULUS–
RESPONSE MAPPING, so the ANOVA model including SUB-
JECT as a factor was used for further analysis. There were sig-
niﬁcant main effects of HAND CUE VALIDITY [F (1,7) = 90.54,
p< 0.001, partial η2 = 0.928], MOVEMENT CUE VALID-
ITY [F (1,7) = 171.12, p< 0.001, partial η2 = 0.961, η2 = 0.155],
and SUBJECT [F (1,7) = 9.29, p< 0.003, partial η2 = 0.797].
There were two signiﬁcant two-way interactions – MOVE-
MENT×MOVEMENT CUEVALIDITY [F (1,7) = 4.98, p = 0.048,
partial η2 = 0.449], and, as anticipated, MOVEMENT CUE
VALIDITY×HAND CUE VALIDITY [Figure 4; F (1,7) = 233.34,
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FIGURE 4 | Reaction time effects for the four combinations of cue
validity: the top panels show the results predicted by the theoretical
architectures of Figure 2.The green lines correspond to valid movement
cues and the blues lines to invalid movement cues. The empirical results
are shown in the lower panel using the same colors. The bars correspond to
SE over subjects. The form of the interaction observed is very close to that
predicted under a model where attention biases prediction errors in an
intrinsic frame of reference (Figure 2).
p< 0.001, partial η2 = 0.971]. As expected, the fastest mean reac-
tion time was seen when both cues were valid (see Table 1).
Figure 4 highlights the nature of this interaction with reference
to the proﬁles predicted by high (extrinsic) and low (intrinsic)
levels of facilitation in the motor hierarchy. It is clear that this pro-
ﬁle is consistent with attentional bias at the (motor cortex) level of
representation, in an intrinsic frame of reference. Quantitatively,
these results suggests that the validity effect is expressed primarily
when both cue dimensions were jointly valid.
Paired t -tests among the four validity categories conﬁrmed
that only one pair failed to show a signiﬁcant difference (after
Bonferroni correction): movement cue valid, hand cue invalid,
and movement cue invalid, hand cue invalid (p> 0.2). All other
pairwise differences were highly signiﬁcant (p< 0.001).
Table 1 | Mean reaction time in milliseconds for each cue validity
condition
Hand cue
Valid Invalid
Movement cue Valid 253.5 (SE: 11.7) 474.7 (SE: 13.7)
Invalid 424.2 (SE: 10.9) 490.0 (SE: 14.3)
DISCUSSION
We have pursued the idea that attention is an integral part of
motor control and expresses itself through biasing the precision
afforded to the proprioceptive and somatosensory consequences
of an anticipated action (Galazky et al., 2009). This places previous
proposals that link motor preparation and attention (cf, Allport,
1987; Goldberg and Segraves, 1987; Rizzolatti et al., 1994; Rush-
worth et al., 2001; Humphreys et al., 2010; see Tipper, 2004 for
an overview) in the general framework of active inference and
predictive coding. The important perspective provided by active
inference is that movements fulﬁll predictions furnished by per-
ceptswithboth exteroceptive (e.g., visual) andproprioceptive (e.g.,
stretch receptor) components.
We have previously demonstrated that the reaction time bene-
ﬁts of cueing can be understood as statistically optimal responses,
where the associated optimization of precision can account for
both psychophysical and electrophysiological phenomena fairly
accurately (Feldman and Friston, 2010). In this paper, we asked
whether similar reaction time beneﬁts can be seen empirically
in the motor domain. To this end, we adapted the paradigm
developed by Rosenbaum (1980), in which two different visual
dimensions (color and spatial frequency) cued the impending
movement. As in Rosenbaum and Kornblum (1982), we pre-
dicted and conﬁrmed that cueing effects would occur only when
both cue dimensions were valid. Our predictions were based on
the possible outcomes of attentional bias at different levels in
the cortical hierarchy; which we associate with representations
in extrinsic (higher) and intrinsic (lower) frames of reference: In
an extrinsic model, one would predict that cueing effects enact
their inﬂuence independently and to a comparable degree. As
outlined above, the interaction between the two validity factors
argues for an intrinsic model, in which hand and movement
are selectively enabled in a way that cannot be separated. In the
present case, the observed interaction can be accounted for by
a model where precision is increased in proprioceptive channels
that represent the conﬂuence of top-down predictions about the
nature of a movement and where it will be implemented (see
Figure 2).
In addition to the interaction above, there was a small reaction
time beneﬁt from a valid hand cue, even if the movement cue was
invalid. The magnitude of this effect was much smaller compared
to the reaction time beneﬁt seen for two valid cues (66 vs. 237 ms).
This, and the lack of any beneﬁt for a valid movement cue if the
hand cue is invalid,means that amodel inwhich precision operates
at the intrinsic level is still the most likely. The small validity effect
of a valid hand cue might be explained in the framework of active
inference; because the movements performed in this experiment
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were self-limited, the same muscles were recruited for both ﬂex-
ion and extension movements, to either initiate or terminate the
movement. Thus, if the precision of the stretch receptor channels
in one forearm were boosted after cuing that side, a small beneﬁt
might accrue for the opposite movement.
Rushworth et al. (1997) also demonstrated a beneﬁt for valid
cuing using a similar paradigm. Spatial cues were used, and
the motor preparation time was calculated from the difference
between two conditions: a simple cuing task in one movement
dimension, and a control task where the movement made did not
depend on the validity of the cue. A small reaction time beneﬁt
was seen for valid cues.
In Rosenbaum (1980), some aspects of the movement were left
unspeciﬁed until the appearance of the target-stimulus. Unlike
our study, Rosenbaum saw separable effects of cuing just the arm,
the direction and the extent of the upcoming movement. How-
ever, there is a key difference between our paradigm and that
of Rosenbaum (1980) that may account for the difference. The
button-press responses used in Rosenbaum (1980) entail visuo-
motor and somatosensory–motor integration. This means that
attentional cueing effects in the visual or somatosensory domains
cannot be disambiguated from purely proprioceptive attention.
Our paradigm avoided conﬂating multiple attention processes by
cueing movements that could be performed using only proprio-
ceptive channels (simple, self-terminated ﬂexion, and extension
movements). This means that one can attribute the cue valid-
ity effects to attentional modulation of proprioceptive signals,
in accordance with active inference. Furthermore, Rosenbaum’s
cues were semantic (letters), whereas ours used low-level visual
features which were arbitrarily mapped onto ﬂexion and exten-
sion movements. The complexity of the semantic cues meant
that most of the reaction time advantages seen in Rosenbaum
(1980) could be accounted for by validity effects on processing
visual targets and their semantic content and not on the move-
ments per se. In short, the simplicity of our movements and
cues suggests a motoric rather than sensory locus for attentional
cueing.
A further study (Rosenbaum and Kornblum, 1982), which
resembled ours except that only two of four possible movements
were possible in each trial, did not ﬁnd that correctly cuing one
response attribute beneﬁted reaction time. They found the oppo-
site – violating the hand and movement cues increased reaction
times relative to violating just the movement cue. Their expla-
nation for this was that both movements were simultaneously
prepared, but choosing between two movements on the same
hand takes longer because the movements are more “similar.” The
larger number of possible movements in our experiment meant
that simultaneously preparing all responses was unlikely (our ﬂex-
ion and extension movements used the same motor plant, while
index and middle ﬁnger movements were used in Rosenbaum and
Kornblum,1982). By contrast,Miller (1982) found a contradictory
effect – advance information of which hand to use gave a reaction
time advantage, whereas advance information of which ﬁnger (on
either hand) did not.
How can these discrepancies be resolved? Cui and Deecke
(1999) found anatomically congruent movements were per-
formed faster than spatially congruent movements, suggesting
that anatomically congruent movements are prepared together
in the motor hierarchy, or, alternatively that the mapping from
extrinsic to intrinsic coordinates is more efﬁcient. Despite the
anatomical distance between [pre]motor cortex in each hemi-
sphere, activity in these areas may be inﬂuenced at an early
stage during motor preparation. If left and right effectors are
competing alternatives for subsequent actions (cf. Cisek and
Kalaska, 2010), several (bilateral) representations can in princi-
ple occur in an intrinsic frame of reference at the same time.
Our results suggest that predictions about impending movements
are integrated to boost processing in effector-based (intrinsic)
coordinates.
Goodman and Kelso (1980) suggested that stimulus–response
mapping time is shorter for cued movements. If this were the
case, we would expect cues correct in one response that men-
tion to provide some reaction time beneﬁt for the other. The
locus of such an effect would likely be before the motor stage;
i.e., early in the stimulus–response interval. However, evidence
from EEG studies suggests that the effects of cueing occur rel-
atively late, again suggesting an effect in intrinsic coordinates:
for example, the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), an EEG
potential evoked when one hand is cued, has been suggested to
be the halfway point between premotor and motor processing
(Osman et al., 1995). This is supported by the ﬁnding that it occurs
nearer to the movement during trials with informative cues than
thosewithout, although the stimulus–LRP latency does not change
(Jentzsch et al., 2004). Finally, we note that a locus of the motor
attentional effect in intrinsic coordinates provides an interesting
parallel with results from the Posner paradigm. The reaction time
beneﬁt associated with cues in most visual paradigms seems to
occur in retinotopic (intrinsic) rather than allocentric (extrin-
sic) frames of reference (Posner and Cohen, 1984; Golomb et al.,
2008).
CONCLUSION
We have explored the idea that motor preparation is an atten-
tional phenomenon that is directed toward proprioceptive sensa-
tions (i.e., predicted sensory feedback of the anticipated motor
response). This perspective suggests that attention should not
be limited to perceptual processing in the exteroceptive (e.g.,
visual) domain but should also bias interoceptive inference dur-
ing movement. We veriﬁed this prediction by adapting a clas-
sical attention (Posner) paradigm for a motor setting. Further-
more, we tried to establish the hierarchical level this atten-
tional bias operates by cueing the movement and effector inde-
pendently. Our behavioral results demonstrate an interaction
between the validity of movement and effector cues. This sug-
gests that the bias for the selected action is mediated at a low
level in the motor hierarchy, in an intrinsic frame of refer-
ence. More generally, the ideas outlined above provide a heuris-
tic framework in which to address questions about the link
between motor preparation and attention, and their mechanistic
underpinnings.
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